Key accounts in mass consumption: how the recovery of the modern channel in Venezuela forces you to redesign your Route to Market

For nearly a decade, the modern retail channel in Venezuela practically disappeared from the strategic radar of consumer goods manufacturers. Supermarket chains that had been key priority accounts lost operational relevance. Some closed, others drastically reduced their operations, and consumers migrated to the traditional channel out of necessity, not preference.

That period is over. And it's ending faster than many manufacturers have incorporated into their current distribution model.

Ítalo Atencio, president of the National Association of Supermarkets and Self-Service Stores of Venezuela (ANSA), confirmed in January 2026 that approximately 40 stores in the country will open, remodel, or change their business model this year. This is not an isolated figure. From 2018 to 2024, the sector accumulated 224 stores opened, remodeled, or transformed. During 2025, 64 new stores were inaugurated. The sector has experienced 20 consecutive quarters of sales growth. Venezuela will close 2025 with 80 active chains and more than 720,000 jobs in the sector.

Modern retail channels already account for 40.3% of mass consumer spending in Venezuela, according to Atenas Grupo Consultor. And the trend is clear: that percentage will continue to grow.

For a manufacturer that has been managing its Venezuelan operations primarily through traditional channels for years, this has very concrete implications that cannot be resolved with a marginal adjustment to the existing model. The most urgent of these is this: key accounts in Venezuela, which were irrelevant a few years ago, are once again becoming strategic, and manufacturers without the structure to manage them professionally will lose ground to those who do.

Why the modern trade channel in Venezuela is growing now

The answer has to do with a structural change in market conditions that has been happening since 2022 and has accelerated this year.

During the worst years of the Venezuelan crisis, supermarkets faced three simultaneous problems that rendered them unviable as a business model: price controls that eliminated profit margins, a shortage of foreign currency that prevented product imports, and inflation that made it impossible to manage inventory profitably. The traditional retail channel survived because its cost structure was radically lower and its capacity for adaptation greater.

What changed was the de facto dollarization of the Venezuelan economy, which eliminated the problem of profit margin management, and a gradual opening to the private sector that allowed for reinvestment in retail. By the end of 2025, 90% of the products on Venezuelan shelves were domestically produced, and the sector grew from 12,043 registered brands to more than 18,000 in just a few years, an increase of 49%.

But here comes the part of the analysis that ANSA's aggregated data does not clearly reflect and that any manufacturer wanting to design a key accounts strategy in Venezuela needs to understand well.

The reality of Venezuela that the published numbers don't show: who is behind some key accounts in mass consumption

When ANSA states that all the entrepreneurs who have opened or remodeled stores are Venezuelan, that statement requires context to be strategically useful.

The direct quote from Ítalo Atencio, president of ANSA, published in Últimas Noticias in January 2025, is this: "When we measure the process from 2018, when all this began in its early stages, until 2024, 224 stores opened, remodeled, or changed their business model in Venezuela; that is the first significant number. It is worth mentioning that in all these cases, they have been national entrepreneurs."

The article itself, which includes that statement, clarifies that Central Madeirense was founded by immigrants from the island of Madeira and Unicasa by Portuguese businessmen. "National businessmen" includes any person with a legally established company in Venezuela, regardless of their origin. The context in which Atencio makes this statement is the National Council for Sovereignty and Peace, led by President Maduro, which gives it a political tone that the business reader should consider when evaluating its implications.

The reality of the modern Venezuelan channel is more heterogeneous. At least four types of operators coexist, each with very different business logics.

Chains with a long-term professional vocation.

Excelsior Gama, founded in 1969 with more than 26 stores. Central Madeirense, since 1949 with 53 stores in 38 cities. Unicasa, since 1982 with 30 stores. Automercados Plaza's with a presence in Miranda, Aragua, and Carabobo. These are the key accounts in Venezuela most willing to work with professional standards of Joint Business Planning ( JBP), planograms, and category development . They are the core of any serious key account strategy in the country.

Politically motivated operators.

During the years of the crisis, physical spaces vacated by traditional chains were filled by new operators with privileged access to foreign currency, soft loans from the government, or import licenses that others could not obtain. Some of these businesses operate according to logics different from those of the market—and their continued presence in the sector could be subject to change depending on how the Venezuelan political environment evolves. For the manufacturer, this necessitates evaluating the long-term stability of these accounts before investing in their development.

The Chinese channel.

One of the fastest-growing segments in Venezuelan retail, and one that isn't captured in ANSA's formal statistics because it frequently operates under local names, is the Chinese market. The Chinese markets in Barquisimeto, Valencia, and eastern Venezuela have created a Chinatown documented in national media. In Caracas, there are significant-scale Chinese operations with a recognized trade association spokesperson. This channel operates with a specific logic: direct purchases from importers, different order cycles, prioritizing price over planograms, and a limited willingness to commit to category development programs. It requires a different customer service model than that used by traditional chains.

Businessmen of Arab and Lebanese origin.

With historically more flexible import networks, some operators from these communities entered the retail sector in areas that the traditional modern channel had abandoned. Their model is often more focused on rapid cash turnover than on the professional development of the channel.

The practical conclusion for designing a key accounts strategy in Venezuela is this: before investing in developing an account, you have to understand what's really behind it — who decides, what logic drives the purchase, how aligned their objectives are with those of the manufacturer, and how predictable their continued presence in the market is.

The Makro case: a mirror of what is happening in the modern Venezuelan channel

Makro is perhaps the most revealing example of the transformation of the modern Venezuelan channel — and also the most misunderstood.

The chain began operations in Venezuela in 1992 as part of the Dutch holding company SHV Holdings, using a "pay and take" wholesale model that eventually reached 37 stores with nationwide coverage. For a mass consumer goods manufacturer, it was a top-tier key account: professional structure, significant volume, and centralized negotiation capabilities.

In 2021, SHV sold its Venezuelan operations to a local conglomerate under the name Farmacias Redvital. The Makro brand survived, the stores remained open, but ownership, decision-making, and business logic changed completely. Today, it operates 27 stores under Venezuelan management.

What makes this case particularly instructive is that SHV's exit from Venezuela was not an isolated decision triggered solely by the Venezuelan crisis. It is part of a regional divestment strategy that the Dutch group is systematically implementing throughout Latin America: it sold its operations in Brazil to Carrefour, then those in Peru to InRetail for $360 million, and recently those in Argentina to Cencosud for $122.5 million. Colombia is the only Latin American market where SHV maintains direct operations, with an uncertain future according to analyses projected to 2025.

This has a direct implication for manufacturers hoping international chains will return to Venezuela when the environment changes: Makro, as an international brand, is not going to return. The movement of international operators is in the opposite direction—they are leaving Latin America, not entering. What could happen, following the pattern of Peru and Argentina, is that strong regional operators will see an opportunity in the available assets if the Venezuelan context allows it. This consolidation scenario is precisely why building key account capacity now—before that movement occurs—is a strategic decision, not an operating expense.

For the international manufacturer aiming to develop the Makro Venezuela account by 2026, the right question isn't how to revive the previous relationship—that relationship doesn't exist. The question is what kind of operator Redvital's Makro is today: which categories it prioritizes, how it makes purchasing decisions, what level of joint planning it's willing to undertake, and how aligned its business objectives are with those of the manufacturer.

The three changes that the evolution of the modern channel demands in the Route to Market model

The strengthening of the modern distribution channel with the entry of new key accounts in the mass consumer market in Venezuela is not simply good news for manufacturers. It signals that the distribution model that worked during the crisis is no longer sufficient to capture the market, which is being reshaped.

• Separate the traditional channel operationally from the modern channel

  For years, many manufacturers managed both channels with the same team, the same distributors, and the same business logic. This was a pragmatic solution for an environment where the modern channel was marginal. With the modern channel now accounting for 40.3% of spending and experiencing sustained growth, this solution is generating friction that manifests as poor service to retailers, an unsuitable product portfolio for each channel, and a loss of market share to competitors with differentiated structures.

• Redesign the distributor network with a logic of territorial exclusivity

Venezuela is demanding greater professionalism and commitment from its regional distributors. This higher standard comes with a counterpart that manufacturers must be prepared to offer: genuine territorial exclusivity. A distributor who invests in capabilities, fleet, and sales team needs the assurance that this investment will not be eroded by another distributor the manufacturer also has operating in the same territory. Exclusivity is not a favor—it's the right contract for a market that is becoming increasingly professional.

• Calibrate the geographic coverage of the modern channel

The 80 supermarket chains operating in Venezuela are not evenly distributed. They are concentrated in Caracas, Valencia, Maracaibo, and the main cities in the interior. Manufacturers who design their modern retail channel strategy with a uniform national vision are over-investing in areas where that channel is weak and under-investing where it is growing most strongly.

The key account structure that consumer goods manufacturers need to build in Venezuela now

Before the crisis, leading manufacturers had relatively well-developed key account structures to manage their relationships with large retail chains. That capacity atrophied during the years when these chains ceased to be strategic accounts.

What's happening in 2026 is that professional accounts are once again demanding the level of attention they previously received. A functional key account structure for today's Venezuela needs three specific capabilities:

• The first is the ability to build and manage a Joint Business Plan with the accounts that are truly willing to do so. Not all of them will be—and that prior segmentation is part of the job. Venezuelan chains that are investing in modernizing their operations want manufacturers who come with a proposal for joint category development, not just a price list.

• The second is the ability to design and manage a success story "differentiated by chain." Each professional operator has its own business model and its own consumer profile. What works at Excelsior Gama, aimed at the upper-middle class, doesn't work at Unicasa, with a presence in more than 30 cities, nor at the local Makro with its wholesale model.

• The third is the ability to measure and manage execution at the point of sale within the modern channel. The traditional channel is managed using coverage and frequency logic. The modern channel additionally requires space management, planograms, shelf pricing, and availability by product reference. These are distinct capabilities that require different processes and tools.

The Venezuelan distributor in 2026: a model that is changing

The Venezuelan distributor that survived the crisis did so with a survival model, not a growth one. The market of 2026 demands something different. A market with 80 active chains, 20 consecutive quarters of sales growth, and 40 new stores projected for this year needs distributors that operate to professional standards.

Manufacturers seeking more professional distributors must offer something in return. And what the Venezuelan market is demanding is genuine territorial exclusivity, structured sales support, and a long-term relationship that justifies the distributor's investment in the region.

The Venezuelan distribution model that will be operational in 2027 and 2028 isn't being built in six months. It's being built now.

What TMC has seen in Venezuela in 30 years

We have been working in Venezuela for 30 years with consumer goods manufacturers, distributors, and retail chains. We have been in the country during its best and most difficult commercial periods.

What we are seeing in 2026 is a market rebuilding its commercial structure at a speed that surprises even those who know it well. But this reconstruction is neither homogeneous nor predictable. The modern Venezuelan channel of 2026 is not the modern channel of 2005. It has more players, more heterogeneity, more complexity in ownership models, and more uncertainty about who will be operating in which format in two or three years.

Manufacturers entering this new cycle with the crisis-era model will lose ground to those who adapt their structure in advance. This isn't because the traditional channel will disappear—59.7% of spending remains and will continue to be critical—but because the modern channel will demand a level of professionalism that can't be improvised at the last minute when the chains require it.

The window to make that transition well is now.

Is your key account structure in Venezuela ready for the coming market?

The first step is a diagnosis. At TMC, we can help you evaluate in two weeks how your current model compares to the demands of the modern Venezuelan channel and what adjustments are priorities to capture the coming growth.

Schedule your diagnostic call here — 30 minutes, free of charge

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Sources consulted

• ANSA / Banking and Business. "ANSA estimates that around 40 stores will open, remodel, or change their business model in 2026." Banking and Business, January 2026.bancaynegocios.com

• ANSA / La Prensa de Monagas. "ANSA reports the opening of 64 new supermarkets this 2025." La Prensa de Monagas, December 2025. laprensademonagas.com

• Latest News / FENAVI. "2024, the year of supermarkets." Latest News, January 2025. fenavi.com.ve

• Atenas Consulting Group. "Consumption in Venezuela is transforming: data reveals new priorities, channels, and opportunities for brands in 2026." Atenas Consulting Group, February 2026. atenasconsultores.com

• Curadas.com . "Venezuelan Consumer 2026: Informed, Focused, and Fragmented." Curadas, April 2026. curadas.com

• Aporrea / Latest News. "97% of the products sold in supermarkets are made in Venezuela." Aporrea, February 2025. aporrea.org

• Colombia Retail / AmericaMalls. "The future of Makro in Colombia after its exit from other Latin American markets." Colombia Retail, February 2025.colombiaretail.com

• EMIS. "Makro Comercializadora SA Company Profile — Venezuela." EMIS, 2025. emis.com

• Peru Retail / Kantar Worldpanel. "The rapid growth of the informal channel in Venezuela." Peru Retail, 2017.peru-retail.com

• Ministry of People's Power for Industries and National Commerce. "Venezuela registers 32% growth in national consumption." MINCI, February 2026. mincomercionacional.gob.ve